<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
<title>P086 - Electronic Voting 2006 - 2nd International Workshop</title>
<link href="http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29133" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29133</id>
<updated>2026-07-23T10:51:25Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-07-23T10:51:25Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>How to create trust in electronic voting over an untrusted platform</title>
<link href="http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29175" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Skagestein, Gerhard</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Haug, Are Vegard</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Nødtvedt, Einar</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Rossebø, Judith</name>
</author>
<id>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29175</id>
<updated>2019-10-16T08:32:20Z</updated>
<published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">How to create trust in electronic voting over an untrusted platform
Skagestein, Gerhard; Haug, Are Vegard; Nødtvedt, Einar; Rossebø, Judith
Krimmer, Robert
Casting electronic votes via an inherently unreliable channel like the Internet in an uncontrolled environment is controversial for two main reasons: The first one is of democratic nature and the second of technical nature. The democratic concerns are about the possible dangers of buying and selling votes and so called 'family voting'. The technical concerns are how to convince everybody involved that the votes will be anonymously and accurately recorded and counted, and that no votes will get changed or lost, and that no 'fake votes' will be introduced, with the knowledge that any computerized system may contain bugs or may be hacked by evildoers. In this paper, we will show how the principle of repeated vote casting may be used to alleviate both the democratic and the technical concerns above, and how hybrid cryptography makes it possible for the voter to inspect his votes as stored within the voting system.
</summary>
<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>E-voting in Brazil - the risks to democracy</title>
<link href="http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29173" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Rodrigues-Filho, José</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Cynthia J., Alexander</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Batista, Luciano C.</name>
</author>
<id>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29173</id>
<updated>2019-10-16T08:32:19Z</updated>
<published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">E-voting in Brazil - the risks to democracy
Rodrigues-Filho, José; Cynthia J., Alexander; Batista, Luciano C.
Krimmer, Robert
Literature has shown that countries with strong democratic traditions, such as the United States and Canada, are not yet using electronic voting systems intensively, due to the concern for and emphasis on security. It has revealed that there is no such thing as an error-free computer system, let alone an electronic voting system, and that existing technology does not offer the conditions necessary for a reliable, accurate and secure electronic voting system. In this context, then, what are the risks of e-voting to democracy? In what ways, if at all, can more fragile, less mature democracies be buttressed with e-voting systems? As a key component of e-democracy, it seems that e-voting technologies are to become more secure and increasingly reliable in the near future and will indeed be adopted in many countries. In what ways, if at all, will the introduction of such systems increase voter confidence in the political system, promote citizen engagement in political life, and nurture the evolution of democracy? If both e-voting and e- democracy are emerging based on popular demand - that is, as a demand-driven alternative to current processes, then there is no doubt that they are likely to enhance and improve the efficiency of traditional democracy. However, if e-voting technology is being introduced based on a supply-driven fashion - the technology exists therefore it should and must be implemented - then the implications for democracy should be considered. Brazil’s introduction of e-voting offers a cautionary tale of supply-driven technological implication. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how the introduction of e-voting in Brazil is highly risky to democracy due to the lack of emphasis on security and the lack of a socially- informed and socially driven approach to technological innovation. The Brazilian example illustrates the democratic implications of a market-driven approach. The lack of a technology strategy designed to promote and extend democratic principles is not surprising given the closed door, market-based negotiations that led to the adoption of e-voting in Brazil. The promise, and indeed, the imperative of a democratic, voter-centered approach as an alternative for the development of an electronic voting system, is explored in the paper.
</summary>
<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The electoral legislation of the basque autonomous community regarding electronic vote</title>
<link href="http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29172" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Fernández, Rosa Ma.</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>González, Esther</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>José Manuel, Vera</name>
</author>
<id>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29172</id>
<updated>2019-10-16T08:32:19Z</updated>
<published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">The electoral legislation of the basque autonomous community regarding electronic vote
Fernández, Rosa Ma.; González, Esther; José Manuel, Vera
Krimmer, Robert
The Basque Autonomous Community constitutes the only Spanish experience of legal electronic vote regulation. The Basque Government decided, by means of a government bill that was voted in its legislative Chamber on June of 1998, to reform its electoral law and insert, as possible option, an electronic vote by means of a magnetic strip card. This Law, which has not been applied yet, presents a series of important changes and of potential modifications in the Basque electoral system and, perhaps, in the Spanish system. At the same time, in the year 2004, a new government Bill of the Basque autonomous Community is presented in which an electronic vote legal regulation is once again presented. The news regarding the previous project are important. Its processing is interrupted by the dissolution of the Chamber and the new Government formation that, still today, has not retaken up this initiative. The electronic vote in “Euskadi” is a regulated normative topic but that has not yet been utilized in an electoral procedure with binding character.
</summary>
<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Multiple casts in online voting: Analyzing chances</title>
<link href="http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29174" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Volkamer, Melanie</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Grimm, Rüdiger</name>
</author>
<id>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/29174</id>
<updated>2019-10-16T08:32:19Z</updated>
<published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Multiple casts in online voting: Analyzing chances
Volkamer, Melanie; Grimm, Rüdiger
Krimmer, Robert
We analyze multiple casts as an easy and non-technical approach to overcome some of the open questions and risks of online voting. The mechanism of multiple casts can be added to almost all existing online voting systems. Nevertheless, there are also some disadvantages, for instance the validity of a timestamp, which are discussed in the paper as well.
</summary>
<dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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