http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/10607 2026-07-23T16:01:10Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/10633 Interview with Jay Nunamaker on “Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing” Briggs, Robert O. 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/10632 Interview with Jonathan Grudin on “Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing” Koch, Michael; Schwabe, Gerhard 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/10637 How (not) to Incent Crowd Workers Straub, Tim; Gimpel, Henner; Teschner, Florian; Weinhardt, Christof Crowdsourcing gains momentum: In digital work places such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, oDesk, Clickworker, 99designs, or InnoCentive it is easy to distribute human work to hundreds or thousands of freelancers. In these crowdsourcing settings, one challenge is to properly incent worker effort to create value. Common incentive schemes are piece rate payments and rank-order tournaments among workers. Tournaments might or might not disclose a worker’s current competitive position via a leaderboard. Following an exploratory approach, we derive a model on worker performance in rank-order tournaments and present a series of real effort studies using experimental techniques on an online labor market to test the model and to compare dyadic tournaments to piece rate payments. Data suggests that on average dyadic tournaments do not improve performance compared to a simple piece rate for simple and short crowdsourcing tasks. Furthermore, giving feedback on the competitive position in such tournaments tends to be negatively related to workers’ performance. This relation is partially mediated by task completion and moderated by the provision of feedback: When playing against strong competitors, feedback is associated with workers quitting the task altogether and, thus, showing lower performance. When the competitors are weak, workers tend to complete the task but with reduced effort. Overall, individual piece rate payments are most simple to communicate and implement while incenting performance is on par with more complex dyadic tournaments. 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/10636 From Top to Bottom Riemer, Kai; Stieglitz, Stefan; Meske, Christian Social media, such as social networking platforms, are increasingly gaining importance in enterprise contexts. Enterprise social networking (ESN) is often associated with improved communication, information-sharing and problem-solving. At the same time, ESN has been argued to diminish the role of formal influence in that users increasingly derive authority from their contributions to the network rather than from their position in the organizational hierarchy. Others argue that ESN will diminish influence considerably by producing more democratic and inclusive communication structures. Yet, these assertions have so far remained largely unexplored empirically. Against this background, we explore what influence both a user’s position in the organization’s hierarchy and a user’s contributions on the network have on the the ability to elicit responses from other ESN users. We draw on a unique data set of more than 110,000 messages collected from the ESN platform used at Deloitte Australia. While we find evidence for both kinds of influence, our data also reveals that informal influence has a stronger effect and that, as the ESN community matures over time, communication structures become indeed more inclusive and balanced across hierarchical levels. We contribute a set of propositions that theorize the ways in which influence and communication pattern are shaped during the process of ESN emergence. Our results further underline the potentials of ESN to improve organic, user-driven communication and knowledge sharing within firms. 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z