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<title>Sicherheit</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19968</link>
<description/>
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<dc:date>2026-07-21T13:24:50Z</dc:date>
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<title>Sicherheit medizintechnischer Protokolle im Krankenhaus</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/40151</link>
<description>Sicherheit medizintechnischer Protokolle im Krankenhaus
Saatjohann, Christoph; Ising, Fabian; Gierlings, Matthias; Noss, Dominik; Schimmler, Sascha; Klemm, Alexander; Grundmann, Leif; Frosch, Tilman; Schinzel, Sebastian
Christian Wressnegger, Delphine Reinhardt
Medizinische Einrichtungen waren in den letzten Jahren immer wieder von Cyber-Angriffen betroffen. Auch wenn sich diese Angriffe derzeit auf die Office-IT-Infrastruktur der Einrichtungen konzentrieren, existiert mit medizinischen Systemen und Kommunikationsprotokollen eine weitere wenig beachtete Angriffsoberfläche.  In diesem Beitrag analysieren wir die weit verbreiteten medizintechnischen Kommunikations-Protokolle DICOM und HL7 sowie Protokoll-Implementierungen auf ihre IT-Sicherheit. Dafür präsentieren wir die Ergebnisse der Sicherheitsanalyse der DICOM-und HL7-Standards, einen Fuzzer “MedFUZZ” für diese Protokolle sowie einen Schwachstellenscanner “MedVAS”, der Schwachstellen in medizintechnischen Produktivumgebungen auffinden kann.
</description>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>On CRDTs in Byzantine Environments</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/40149</link>
<description>On CRDTs in Byzantine Environments
Jacob, Florian; Bayreuther, Saskia; Hartenstein, Hannes
Christian Wressnegger, Delphine Reinhardt
Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) allow updates to be applied to different replicas independently and concurrently, without the need for a remote conflict resolution. Thus, they provide a building block for scalability and performance of fault-tolerant distributed systems. Currently, CRDTs are typically used in a crash fault setting for global scale, partition-tolerant, highly available databases or collaborative applications. In this paper, we explore the use of CRDTs in Byzantine environments. This exploration is inspired by the popular Matrix messaging system: as recently shown, the underlying Matrix Event Graph replicated data type represents a CRDT that can very well deal with Byzantine behavior. This “Byzantine Tolerance” is due to mechanisms inherent in CRDTs and in the hash-based directed acyclic graph (HashDAG) data structure used in Matrix. These mechanisms restrict Byzantine behavior. We, therefore, discuss Byzantine behavior in a context of CRDTs, and how the notion of Byzantine tolerance relates to equivocation. We show that a subclass of CRDTs is equivocation-tolerant, i.e., without equivocation detection, prevention or remediation, this subclass still fulfills the CRDT properties, which leads to Byzantine tolerance. We conjecture that an operation-based Byzantine-tolerant CRDT design supporting non-commutative operations needs to be based on a HashDAG data structure. We close the paper with thoughts on chances and limits of this data type.
</description>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Recovering information from pixelized credentials</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/40150</link>
<description>Recovering information from pixelized credentials
Garske, Viktor; Noack, Andreas
Christian Wressnegger, Delphine Reinhardt
Pixelation is a common technique to redact sensitive information like credentials in images. In this paper, we propose a system that is able to recover information from pixelized text. Our contribution consists of a neural network as well as a generic pipeline that generates a realistic training dataset considering flexible specifications including wordlists, fonts, font sizes and letter spacings. The contributed neural network is a composition of a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) using Long short-term memory (LSTM) and a Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) layer to decode sequences of characters. With our approach, we achieve a Label Error Rate (LER) under 50% when taking pixelation block sizes of up to 8 × 8 pixels on a 22pt font into account. Thereby, our results indicate that pixelation of sensitive data does not satisfy common privacy standards.
</description>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>PrivacyDates: A Framework for More Privacy-Preserving Timestamp Data Types</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/40148</link>
<description>PrivacyDates: A Framework for More Privacy-Preserving Timestamp Data Types
Burkert, Christian; Balack, Jonathan; Federrath, Hannes
Christian Wressnegger, Delphine Reinhardt
Case studies of application software data models indicate that timestamps are excessively used in connection with user activity. This contradicts the principle of data minimisation which demands a limitation to data necessary for a given purpose. Prior work has also identified common purposes of timestamps that can be realised by more privacy-preserving alternatives like counters and dates with purpose-oriented precision. In this paper, we follow up by demonstrating the real-world applicability of those alternatives. We design and implement three timestamp alternatives for the popular web development framework Django and evaluate their practicality by replacing conventional timestamps in the project management application Taiga.
</description>
<dc:date>2022-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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