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<title>Wirtschaftsinformatik 45(3) - Juni 2003</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/11849</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:58:52 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-07-23T15:58:52Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>Das ökonomische kalkül eines anbieters von mediendateien bei filesharing-diensten</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12364</link>
<description>Das ökonomische kalkül eines anbieters von mediendateien bei filesharing-diensten
Becker, Jan U.; Clement, Michel
Filesharing has recently proved to be one of the most controversial applications in the Internet. Millions of users enjoy downloads of billions of media files such as songs or movies. But where do these files come from? While the economic rationale to download files is obvious, the rationale of individuals to actually share and therefore internalize the costs (i.e. the risk of being sued for copyright infringement) is not obvious. Consequently empirical studies have shown a large proportion of users not offering any but demanding files and therefore freeride on their peers.Nevertheless sharing can be rational. This article offers a theoretical base to explain sharing and proves that the users’ utility considerations depend heavily on the networks life cycle. The user’s utility of sharing decreases over time. In order to prevent the (theoretically) inevitable break-down of the filesharing network, the authors present strategies for filesharing networks to enhance the user’s willingness to share.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Webservices zur integration interaktiver elektronischer verhandlungen in elektronische marktplätze</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12362</link>
<description>Webservices zur integration interaktiver elektronischer verhandlungen in elektronische marktplätze
Rebstock, Michael; Lipp, Michael
We analyze and develop web services for the integration of spontaneous interactive bilateral multi-attribute electronic negotiations into electronic marketplaces. Conceptual and technical foundations of electronic markets and electronic negotiations, of web services and of RDF are discussed. The overall architectural design of the negotiation application and of the underlying transaction scenario is described. The information flow between the services is explained and their functionalities, as well as the documents exchanged, are developed. Finally, our results and related work are discussed and an outlook is given.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Peer-to-peer-netzwerke für das ressourcenmanagement</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12363</link>
<description>Peer-to-peer-netzwerke für das ressourcenmanagement
Schoder, Detlef; Fischbach, Kai
This survey reviews key concepts of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking. The management of resources such as bandwidth, storage, information, files and CPU cycles based on P2P networks are highlighted. A model differentiating P2P infrastructures, P2P applications and P2P communities is introduced, which provides a better understanding of different perspectives of P2P. Core technical and social challenges are discussed which still limit the potentials of information systems based on P2P architectures.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12363</guid>
<dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12357</link>
<description>Resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks
Grothoff, Christian
Resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks — An excess-based economic model This paper describes economic aspects of GNUnet, a peer-to-peer framework for anonymous distributed file-sharing. GNUnet is decentralized; all nodes are equal peers. In particular, there are no trusted entities in the network. This paper describes an economic model to perform resource allocation and defend against malicious participants in this context. The approach presented does not use credentials or payments; rather, it is based on trust. The design is much like that of a cooperative game in which peers take the role of players. Nodes must cooperate to achieve individual goals. In such a scenario, it is important to be able to distinguish between nodes exhibiting friendly behavior and those exhibiting malicious behavior. GNUnet aims to provide anonymity for its users. Its design makes it hard to link a transaction to the node where it originated from. While anonymity requirements make a global view of the end-points of a transaction infeasible, the local link-to-link messages can be fully authenticated. Our economic model is based entirely on this local view of the network and takes only local decisions.
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<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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