<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>P167 - 4th International Conference on Electronic Voting 2010</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19487</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:30:24 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-07-21T13:30:24Z</dc:date>

<item>
<title>A survey: electronic voting development and trends</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19508</link>
<description>A survey: electronic voting development and trends
Weldemariam, Komminist; Villafiorita, Adolfo
Krimmer, Robert; Grimm, Rüdiger
Any practitioner working on electronic voting (e-voting) seems to have different opinions on the main issues that seem to affect the area. On the one handgiven the criticality and the risk e-voting systems potentially pose to the democratic process-e-voting systems are permanently under a magnifying glass that amplifies any glitch, be it significant or not. On the other hand, given the interest e-voting raises within the general public, there seems to be a tendency to generalize and oversimplify. This tendency leads to attributing specific problems to all systems, regardless of context, situation, and actual systems used. Additionally, scarce know-how about the electoral context often contributes to make matters even more confused. This is not to say all e-voting systems show the security and reliability characteristics that are necessary for a system of such a criticality. On the contrary, a lot of work still has to be done. Starting from previous experiences and from a large-scale experiment we conducted in Italy, this paper provides some direction, issues, and trends in e-voting. Getting a clearer view of the research activities in the area, highlighting both positive and negative results, and emphasizing some trends could help, in our opinion, to draw a neater line between opinion and facts, and contribute to the construction of a next generation of e-voting machines to be safely and more confidently employed for elections.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19508</guid>
<dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Compliance of POLYAS with the common criteria protection profile - a 2010 Outlook on certified remote electronic voting</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19507</link>
<description>Compliance of POLYAS with the common criteria protection profile - a 2010 Outlook on certified remote electronic voting
Menke, Niels; Reinhard, Kai
Krimmer, Robert; Grimm, Rüdiger
In 2008, the German Federal Office for Information Security issued the common criteria protection profile for Online Voting Products (PP-0037). Accordingly, we evaluated the Polyas electronic voting system, which is used for legally binding elections in several international organizations (German Gesellschaft for Informatik, GI, among others), for compliance with the common criteria protection profile and worked toward fulfilling the given requirements. In this article we present the findings of the process of creating a compliant security target, necessary restrictions and assumptions to the system design as well as the workings of the committee, and architectural and procedural changes made necessary.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19507</guid>
<dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>A formal IT-security model for the correction and abort requirement of electronic voting</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19506</link>
<description>A formal IT-security model for the correction and abort requirement of electronic voting
Grimm, Rüdiger; Hupf, Katharina; Volkamer, Melanie
Krimmer, Robert; Grimm, Rüdiger
This paper addresses a basic security requirement of electronic voting, namely that a voter can correct or abort his vote at any time prior to his final vote casting. This requirement serves as a protection against voter precipitance (haste). We specify rules for a reset and cancel function that implement the correction and abort requirement. These rules are integrated in an extended version of the formal IT security model provided in [VG08]. We show that these rules do respect the requirements covered in this model namely that each voter can cast a vote, that no voter loses his voting right without having cast a vote and that only eligible voters can cast a vote. This paper formally describes and mathematically proves the model and finally shows at which places of a voting process the formal rules apply.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19506</guid>
<dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Scantegrity mock election at Takoma Park</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19503</link>
<description>Scantegrity mock election at Takoma Park
Sherman, Alan T.; Carback, Richard; Chaum, David; Clark, Jeremy; Essex, Aleksander; Herrnson, Paul S.; Mayberry, Travis; Popoveniuc, Stefan; Rivest, Ronald L.; Shen, Emily; Sinha, Bimal; Vora, Poorvi
Krimmer, Robert; Grimm, Rüdiger
We report on our experiences and lessons learned using Scantegrity II in a mock election held April 11, 2009, in Takoma Park, Maryland (USA). Ninetyfive members of the community participated in our test of this voting system proposed for the November 2009 municipal election. Results helped improve the system for the November binding election.
</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/19503</guid>
<dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
