http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20080 Thu, 23 Jul 2026 09:03:28 GMT 2026-07-23T09:03:28Z http://dl.gi.de:80/bitstream/id/3fd4ca87-8bfa-4b50-8057-da1f1f691835/ http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20080 http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2677 On the vulnerability of finger vein recognition to spoofing Tome, Pedro; Vanoni, Matthias; Marcel, Sébastien Brömme, Arslan; Busch, Christoph The vulnerability of finger vein recognition to spoofing is studied in this paper. A collection of spoofing finger vein images has been created from real finger vein samples. Finger vein images are printed using a commercial printer and then, presented at an open source finger vein sensor. Experiments are carried out using an extensible framework, which allows fair and reproducible benchmarks. Experimental results lead to a spoofing false accept rate of 86\%, thus showing that finger vein biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks, pointing out the importance to investigate countermeasures against this type of fraudulent actions. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2677 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2676 Pre-processing cascades and fusion in finger vein recognition Kauba, Christoph; Reissig, Jakob; Uhl, Andreas Brömme, Arslan; Busch, Christoph Preprocessing and fusion techniques for finger vein recognition are investigated. An experimental study involving a set of preprocessing approaches shows the importance of selecting the appropriate single technique and the usefulness of cascading several different preprocessing methods for subsequent feature extraction of various types. Score level fusion is able to significantly improve recognition results, in particular when combining features describing complementary finger image properties. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2676 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2674 When a bloom filter is a doom filter: security assessment of a novel iris biometric template protection system Hermans, Jens; Mennink, Bart; Peeters, Roel Brömme, Arslan; Busch, Christoph Biometric template protection systems are expected to meet two major security requirements: irreversibility and unlinkability. We analyze the Bloom filter based iris biometric template protection system recently introduced by Rathgeb et al. at ICB 2013 and IET Biometrics 2014. We demonstrate that the scheme does not achieve unlinkability, presenting a simple attack that in the worst case succeeds with probability at least 96\%. We also present a security analysis on generating false positives or recovering the key, both leading to undesirably low attack complexities: 225 for generating false positives for the smaller versions of the scheme, and a complexity between 22 and 28 for recovering the secret key. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2674 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2672 Speedup for European epassport authentication Peeters, Roel; Hermans, Jens; Mennink, Bart Brömme, Arslan; Busch, Christoph The overall ePassport authentication procedure should be fast to have a sufficient throughput of people at border crossings such as airports. At the same time, the ePassport and its holder should be checked as thoroughly as possible. By speeding up the ePassport authentication procedure, more time can be spend on verification of biometrics. We demonstrate that our proposed solution allows to replace the current combination of PACE and EAC with a more efficient authentication procedure that provides even better security and privacy guarantees. When abstracting away from the time needed for the ePassport to verify the terminal's certificate, a speed-up of at least 40\% in comparison with the current ePassport authentication procedure is to be expected. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/2672 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z