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<title>P293 - Open Identity Summit 2019</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20979</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:32:24 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-07-21T13:32:24Z</dc:date>
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<title>P293 - Open Identity Summit 2019</title>
<url>http://dl.gi.de:80/bitstream/id/768876db-6f6e-4cb7-81d8-79b138fb68d9/</url>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20979</link>
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<title>GTPL: A Graphical Trust Policy Language</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20998</link>
<description>GTPL: A Graphical Trust Policy Language
Mödersheim, Sebastian Alexander; Ni, Bihang
Roßnagel, Heiko; Wagner, Sven; Hühnlein, Detlef
We present GTPL, a Graphical Trust Policy Language, as an easy-to-use interface for the Trust Policy Language TPL proposed by the LIGHTest project. GTPL uses a simple graphical representation where the central graphical metaphor is to consider the input like certificates or documents as forms and the policy author describes “what to look for” in these forms by putting constrains on the form’s fields. GTPL closes the gap between languages on a logical technical level such as TPL that require expertise to use, and interfaces like the LIGHTest Graphical-Layer that allow only for very basic patterns.
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item>
<title>Implementation of Distributed Light weight trust infrastructure for automatic validation of faults in an IOT sensor network</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20996</link>
<description>Implementation of Distributed Light weight trust infrastructure for automatic validation of faults in an IOT sensor network
Jeyakumar, Isaac Henderson Johnson; Wagner, Sven; Roßnagel, Heiko
Roßnagel, Heiko; Wagner, Sven; Hühnlein, Detlef
The goal of the paper is to design and implement a distributed trust infrastructure, which makes use of the existing Internet Domain Name System (DNS) and its global trust anchor. Since it has high scalability and eases the burden on relying parties in turn, allows for highly efficient queries to support individual trust decisions. In this implementation, a stand-alone private DNS infrastructure including top level domains was developed with Raspberry Pi Cluster. Further, the security of the DNS for the trust infrastructure is enhanced by implementing DNSSEC and DANE protocol with TLSA resource records. It also includes the core functionality of the LIGHTest infrastructure like developing trust lists, Trust Scheme Publication Authority (TSPA) and a Delegation Publisher (DP). In this paper, a distributed trust infrastructure is developed and visualized practically by designing an infrastructure for validation and authentication of faults in the sensor system of an organization using a Raspberry Pi Cluster.
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>Security Analysis of XAdES Validation in the CEF Digital Signature Services (DSS)</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20997</link>
<description>Security Analysis of XAdES Validation in the CEF Digital Signature Services (DSS)
Engelbertz, Nils; Mladenov, Vladislav; Somorovsky, Juraj; Herring, David; Erinola, Nurullah; Schwenk, Jörg
Roßnagel, Heiko; Wagner, Sven; Hühnlein, Detlef
Within the European Union (EU), the eIDAS regulation sets legal boundaries for crossborder acceptance of Trust Services (TSs) such as Electronic Signatures. To facilitate compliant implementations, an open source software library to create and validate signed documents is provided by the eSignature building block of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). We systematically evaluated the validation logic of this library with regards to XML-based attacks. The discovered vulnerabilities allowed us to read server files and bypass XML Advanced Electronic Signature (XAdES) protections. The seriousness of the vulnerabilities shows that there is an urgent need for security best-practice documents and automatic security evaluation tools to support the development of security-relevant implementations.
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<title>DNS-based Trust Scheme Publication and Discovery</title>
<link>http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/20993</link>
<description>DNS-based Trust Scheme Publication and Discovery
Wagner, Georg; Wagner, Sven; More, Stefan; Hoffmann, Martin
Roßnagel, Heiko; Wagner, Sven; Hühnlein, Detlef
Trust infrastructures are at the heart of a digital world. Within those trust infrastructures, trust schemes play an important role and often represent legal or organizational entities. Right now, trust schemes are published in the form of lists. Those lists enumerate all the trust services and their level of assurance. Trusted discovery only works if the URI of the trust list is known to the verifying party. In this paper, we introduce a Trust Scheme Publication Authority for arbitrary trust schemes. Our approach uses the Domain Name System (DNS) and its security extensions (DNSSEC) to publish
discovery data securely.
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<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2019-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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