http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/21100 Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:57:04 GMT 2026-07-23T20:57:04Z http://dl.gi.de:80/bitstream/id/7065e33e-1c56-45e3-8e87-39fc6c0504b9/ http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/21100 http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/151 Ontologiebasierte Abhängigkeitsanalyse im Projektlastenheft Zichler, Konstantin; Helke, Steffen Dencker, Peter; Klenk, Herbert; Keller, Hubert B.; Plödererder, Erhard Zu Beginn eines Projekts dokumentieren interdisziplinäre Domänen-Experten die Anforderungen an alle Lebensphasen eines Nutzfahrzeugs und die entsprechenden Realisierungskonzepte im Projektlastenheft. Die Kenntnis der Abhängigkeiten zwischen Anforderungen bietet den Vorteil, fehlerhafte Produktkonzepte bereits in der frühen Projektphase zu vermeiden. Bei der Durchführung von Abhängigkeitsanalysen besteht für die Experten der einzelnen Abteilungen die Schwierigkeit darin, von den dokumentierten Einzelbeiträgen auf domänenübergreifende Abhängigkeiten zwischen den Anforderungen zu schließen. Bisher werden diese Analysen für gewöhnlich manuell durchgeführt, da es dafür kaum Werkzeugunterstützung gibt. Wir stellen ein neuartiges Verfahren vor, bei dem das für die Abhängigkeitsanalyse erforderliche, fachspezifische Wissen zu einer gemeinsamen Wissensbasis in Form einer Ontologie aggregiert wird. Zusammen mit Axiomen, einem Reasoner und Werkzeugen aus dem Natural Language Processing wird eine automatisierte Abhängigkeitsanalyse im Projektlastenheft realisiert, mit der es möglich ist, bisher nicht berücksichtigte Abhängigkeiten zwischen Anforderungen zu identifizieren. Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/151 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/152 Performing a More Realistic Safety Analysis by Means of the Six-Variable Model Ulfat-Bunyadi, Nelufar; Hatebur, Denis; Heisel, Maritta Dencker, Peter; Klenk, Herbert; Keller, Hubert B.; Plödererder, Erhard Safety analysis typically consists of hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) as well as fault tree analysis (FTA). During the first, possible hazardous events are identified. During the latter, failure events that can lead to a hazardous event are identified. Usually, the focus of FTA is on identifying failure events within the system. However, a hazardous event may also occur due to invalid assumptions about the system’s environment. If the possibility that environmental assumptions turn invalid is considered during safety analysis, a more realistic and complete safety analysis is performed than without considering them. Yet, a major challenge consists in eliciting first the ‘real’ environmental assumptions. Developers do not always document assumptions, and often they are not aware of the assumptions they make. In previous work, we defined the Six-Variable Model which provides support in making the ‘real’ environmental assumptions explicit. In this paper, we define a safety analysis method based on the Six-Variable Model. The benefit of our method is that we make the environmental assumptions explicit and consider them in safety analysis. In this way, assumptions that are too strong and too risky can be identified and weakened or abandoned if necessary. Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/152 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/144 Automotive - Safety & Security 2017 - Sicherheit und Zuverlässigkeit für automobile Informationstechnik Dencker, Peter; Klenk, Herbert; Keller, Hubert B.; Plödererder, Erhard Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/144 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/145 Risk-Oriented Security Engineering Ebert, Christof Dencker, Peter; Klenk, Herbert; Keller, Hubert B.; Plödererder, Erhard Virtually every connected system will be attacked sooner or later. A 100% secure solution is not feasible. Therefore, advanced risk assessment and mitigation is the order of the day. Risk-oriented security engineering for automotive systems helps in both designing for robust systems as well as effective mitigation upon attacks or exploits of vulnerabilities. Security must be integrated early in the design phase of a vehicle to understand the threats and risks to car functions. The security analysis provides requirements and test vectors and adequate measures can be derived for balanced costs and efforts. The results are useful in the partitioning phase when functionality is distributed to ECUs and networks. We will show with concrete examples how risk-oriented cyber security can be successfully achieved in automotive systems. Three levers for automotive security are addressed: (1) Product, i.e., designing for security for components and the system, (2) Process, i.e., implementing cyber security concepts in the development process and (3) Field, i.e., ensuring security concepts are applied during service activities and effective during regular operations. Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/145 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z