| dc.contributor.author | Franck, Egon | |
| dc.date | 2003-10-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-01-16T08:51:19Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-01-16T08:51:19Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1861-8936 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12372 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The analysis focuses on the basic institutional mechanisms governing open source software development. It explains why these institutional mechanisms enable rent-seeking without crowding out donative behavior. The “symbiotic” institutional arrangements translate into an ability to attract contributors with heterogeneous motivations. | |
| dc.publisher | Springer | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Wirtschaftsinformatik: Vol. 45, No. 5 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Wirtschaftsinformatik | |
| dc.subject | crowding out | |
| dc.subject | donative behavior | |
| dc.subject | General Public License | |
| dc.subject | open source software | |
| dc.subject | peer review | |
| dc.subject | property rights | |
| dc.subject | rent-seeking | |
| dc.title | Open Source aus ökonomischer Sicht — Zu den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen einer spenderkompatiblen Rentensuche | |
| dc.type | Text/Journal Article | |
| mci.reference.pages | 527-532 | |
| gi.identifier.doi | 10.1007/BF03250917 | |
