An Incentives-Based Analysis Of Pollution Prevention Regulation in The United States

Abstract

Pollution prevention stands at the forefront of industry's potentiality and practice of ecological responsibility. Yet, business and industry have not always lived up to this potential on their own, and there is still an important role for governments to play in establishing regulatory baselines. This paper explores some of the key relationships between good corporate practices and efficient governance to help conceive of ways for the two to work together more effectively. An examination of industry’s incentives and barriers to voluntarily undertake pollution prevention projects is the first step in the analysis of optimal or preferable regulatory forms. The regulatory regimes considered in this study are then categorized as either more intrusive (less voluntary) or less intrusive (more voluntary). A theoretical framework is created in the form of a taxonomy that relates several possible incentive states to preferred regulatory regimes (no regulation, less intrusive, or more intrusive). This type of structure for classifying and using information is an important, functional step in bringing social, cultural, and organizational considerations within the fields of information technology and informatics.