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dc.contributor.authorGüdemann, Matthias
dc.contributor.authorOrtmeier, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-06T08:59:13Z
dc.date.available2017-12-06T08:59:13Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.issn0724-5319
dc.identifier.urihttp://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/8536
dc.description.abstractThe rising complexity of many safety-critical systems necessitates new analysis methods. Model-based safety analysis approaches aim at finding critical failure combinations by analysis of models of the whole system (i.e. software, hardware, and failure modes). The big advantage of these methods compared to traditional approaches is that the results are of very high significance. Until now, model-based approaches have only to a limited extent been applied to answer quantitative questions in safety analysis. Model-based approaches in this context are often limited to analysis of specific failure propagation models. They do not include system dynamics and behavior. A consequence is, that the methods are very error-prone because of wrong assumptions. New achievements in the domain of (probabilistic) model-checking now allow for overcoming this problem. This paper illustrates how such an approach for quantitative model-based safety analysis is used to model and analyze a real-world case study from the railway domain.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherGesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
dc.relation.ispartofFERS-Mitteilungen: Vol. 29, No. 1
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFERS-Mitteilungen
dc.subjectFailure Mode
dc.subjectFailure Probability
dc.subjectOccurrence Pattern
dc.subjectFault Tree Analysis
dc.subjectHazard Probability
dc.titleQuantitative Model-Based Safety Analysis: A Case Studyen
dc.typeText/Journal Article
mci.reference.pages5-16
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/BF03345451


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