| dc.contributor.author | Aubert, Benoit A. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Patry, Michel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Rivard, Suzanne | |
| dc.date | 2003-04-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-01-16T08:50:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-01-16T08:50:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2003 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1861-8936 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dl.gi.de/handle/20.500.12116/12348 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations. In the first case, contractual problems derailed the original agreement and precipitated a disastrous divorce. In the second case, the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship. Agency theory provides a conceptual background for analyzing the cases. Lessons are drawn from the experiences of the firms studied, and recommendations are made for the design of outsourcing contracts that curb contractual opportunism. | |
| dc.publisher | Springer | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Wirtschaftsinformatik: Vol. 45, No. 2 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Wirtschaftsinformatik | |
| dc.subject | agency theory | |
| dc.subject | incentive contracts | |
| dc.subject | outsourcing | |
| dc.title | A tale of two outsourcing contracts | |
| dc.type | Text/Journal Article | |
| mci.reference.pages | 181-190 | |
| gi.identifier.doi | 10.1007/BF03250897 | |
